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INTRODUCTION
Can private parties use Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)
mechanisms to systematically advance human rights? For at least two decades
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now, we have known the inverse is possible: private companies can use ISDS
mechanisms to stymie human rights. That is the lesson of Ethyl Corporation's
1997 claim challenging a Canadian import ban on the gasoline additive
methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl (MMT).1 The chemical
manufacturer's $251 million claim was only the third filed through the North
American Free Trade Agreement's ISDS provisions and the largest ever filed at
the time.2 In retrospect, however, what made the claim notable was not its
historic size, but rather that it signaled corporations' willingness to use ISDS to
challenge government policies that fulfill core human rights obligations.3
The Canadian government had instituted the ban because it believed MMT
was a dangerous toxin that posed a significant public health risk.4 The U.S.
government, for example, had already banned MMT's use in formulated
gasoline. Yet Ethyl filed a claim arguing that the import ban's negative impact
on its business constituted a form of indirect expropriation.6 In so doing, it
directly challenged the Canadian government's ability to regulate in the interest
of its citizens' health. Ethyl's suit also proved devastatingly effective. Canada
settled the suit with Ethyl and agreed to lift the MMT import ban entirely.7
In the two decades ince Ethyl's successful fight against Canada, investors
have used ISDS mechanisms to challenge environmental, health, and other social
regulations regarding waste disposal, tobacco control, and similar social
services.8 Because arbitral awards are enforceable against the losing party, each
individual ISDS claim is a potent tool for focusing the mind of the government.9
Just like Canada did with Ethyl, governments may choose to abandon otherwise
1, Ethyl Corp. v. Government of Canada, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶ 5 (June 24, 1998), 38 I.L.M.
708-31 (1999) [hereinafter Ethyl Corp. Award].
2. Michelle Sforza & Mark Vallianatos, NAFTA & Environmental Laws: Ethyl Corp. v.
Government of Canada, GLOBAL POL'Y F. (Apr. 1997), http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/
content/article/212/45381.html.
3. Commentators Michelle Sforza and Mark Vallianatos wrote at the time that the suit
"demonstrates how present and future international economic pacts could pose a danger to environmental
regulations and other safeguards." Sforza & Villianatos, supra note 2; see also The Right to Health, OFF.
U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS. & WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2008), http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Publications/Factsheet3 I.pdf (discussing the right to health).
4. Sforza & Villianatos, supra note 2.
5. Id.
6. Ethyl Corp. Award, supra note 1, T 7.
7. Letter from Judith Resnik, Professor of Law, Yale Law Sch., et al., to Mitch McConnell,
Senate Majority Leader, U.S. Congress (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/r/2010-
2019/WashingtonPost/2015/04/ 30/Editorial-Opinion/Graphics/opposeISDSLetter.pdf ("After the
arbitration panel rejected Canada's argument that Ethyl lacked standing to bring the challenge, Canada
settled the suit for $13 million. Moreover, Canada lifted the ban on the toxic additive as part of the
settlement."); see also Michelle Sforza & Mark Vallianatos, Ethyl Corporation v.s. Government of
Canada: Now Investors Can Use NAFTA to Challenge Environmental Safeguards, PUB. CITIZEN,
https://www.citizen.org/our-work/globalization-and-trade/e.thyl-briefing-paper (last visited Apr. 18,
2018) (discussing this suit).
8. Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, Report of the Independent Expert on the Promotion of a
Democratic and Equitable International Order, 16, U.N. Doc. A/70/285 (Aug. 5, 2015).
9. See, e.g., Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States art. 54(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]
("Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and
enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment
of a court in that State.").
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pro-human rights policies rather than risk a costly loss if the matter goes to
arbitration.10 Beyond the individual impact of each claim, two decades of
corporations using ISDS claims have cumulatively impressed upon governments
the legal costs of regulating to advance human rights at odds with private
interests. This unidirectional regulatory chill makes governments less likely even
to attempt to pursue such policies in the first place.
The growing role of ISDS mechanisms in stymying pro-human rights
policies has generated a rich literature on potential ways to reform the ISDS
system, the need to eliminate it altogether, or the importance of saving it despite
its shortcomings." Lost in this otherwise valuable macro-level debate is the
practical reality that the current ISDS regime is almost certain to remain in place
for at least a few more decades to come. Not only is there momentum behind the
existing system, but many Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and International
Investment Agreements (IAs) contain clauses that effectively guarantee ISDS's
continued existence for another ten to twenty years.12 In the United States, ISDS
provisions may survive unscathed, despite the radioactive rhetoric regarding
America's existing trade deals. Even as President Donald Trump seeks to
renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), he has so far
indicated that he intends to keep the NAFTA's ISDS provisions largely
unchanged.13 Campaigns to reform or eliminate the ISDS regime are therefore
only -likely to succeed in the long term. Recognizing this reality, this Note
focuses on finding a short- to medium-term solution: enabling private actors to
bring ISDS claims that intentionally and systematically advance a human rights
agenda. To date, the potential for private parties to bring such claims in the ISDS
system has largely gone ignored.
10. As I discuss in Part I, this Note uses the term "pro-human rights" to refer to policies that
advance socioeconomic rights. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (Itt) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(Dec. 10, 1948); G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, arts. IX-XV (Dec. 16 1966). I do not use the term "pro-human rights" to refer to State-driven
policies that aim only to liberalize the economy or create a more business friendly environment. Some
argue that such policies do advance political and economic freedom and, by extension, human rights. Such
a debate is beyond the scope of this Note.
11. See discussion infra Section III.A.
12. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY art. 22(3)
(2012), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf [hereinafter U.S. MODEL BIT]; FED.
MINISTRY OF ECON. & TECH. (GER.), GERMAN MODEL TREATY-2008, art. 13(3),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/archive/ital025.pdf [hereinafter GERMAN MODEL TREATY-
2008].
13. OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SUMMARY OF OBJECTIVES FOR THE NAFTA
RENEGOTIATION 17 (2017), http://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/NAFTAObjectives.pdf
(stating that ISDS provisions should remain, but should be improved through increased transparency and
efficiency in adjudication); see also David Singh Grewal, Investor Protection, National Sovereignty, and
the Rule of Law, 2 AM. AFF. J. 17, 18 (2018), http://americanaffairsjournal.org/2018/02/investor-
protection-national-sovereignty-rule-law ("Strikingly, what appears to be missing from the
administration's current trade priorities is a commitment to rethinking one of the most controversial
provisions of NAFTA-its special procedures for resolving disputes between private foreign investors
and member states."); David Dayen, Trump's Renegotiation ofNAFTA Is Starting To Look a Lot Like the
TPP, NATION (July 18, 2017), http://www.thenation.com/article/trumps-renegotiation-of-nafta-is-
starting-to-look-a-lot-like-the-tpp (noting that the United States Trade Representative's objectives for the
NAFTA renegotiation would bar labor and environmental groups from suing foreign governments under
the NAFTA directly, even though it would allow foreign investors to sue foreign governments under ISDS
provisions directly).
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This Note argues that investors and domestic communities can take
advantage of a new asset class-social impact bonds-to purchase the right to
use ISDS mechanisms to pressure States to maintain pro-human rights policies.
While social impact bonds are a relatively new asset class, the market for them
is rapidly growing.14 Both public and private entities around the world have
already issued social impact bonds in both the Global North and South," and at
least one estimate suggests hat the commercial market for social impact bonds
is anticipated to reach $1 trillion within the next decade.16 This means that social
impact bonds provide a vehicle for investors to "purchase standing" to bring pro-
human rights ISDS claims in a growing set of contexts around the world.
This Note provides a roadmap for how investors might execute this
strategy. It provides an example of the type of social impact bond that investors
might wish to purchase, and details how they might use the doctrines of indirect
expropriation and fair and equitable treatment to raise their claims. The Note
tracks the legal arguments that companies have used to advance their private
interests, and shows how investors holding social impact bonds might deploy
these same arguments on behalf of domestic constituencies. In order to do this
effectively, investors should work in close coordination with the domestic
movements and communities they are trying to help. While enabling these
investors to pursue such a strategy in tandem with local movements would be a
positive step, it would be ideal if domestic communities could advance their own
human rights themselves. As such, this Note briefly suggests how the Tokios
Tokelds doctrine might enable domestic communities to do so through ISDS
mechanisms.
Investors and domestic communities hould consider adopting these legal
strategies because ISDS mechanisms offer unique advantages for human rights
advocates. ISDS mechanisms can serve as rare international legal tools that
provide a private, enforceable cause of action. To date, investors have used
claims to convince governments to abandon otherwise pro-human rights policies.
Investors and domestic communities can use the legal strategies advanced in this
Note to encourage pro-human rights policies, too. Relatedly, if investors and
domestic communities adopt these strategies en masse, this will have the
cumulative effective of reversing the unidirectional regulatory chill ISDS
mechanisms have so far engendered. This would create a more human-rights-
friendly policymaking environment.
This Note proceeds in three Parts. First, it explains how companies coopted
the ISDS regime to push it beyond its initial narrow focus on preventing
expropriation to instead serve as a legal mechanism for fighting back against a
14. Adriana Barajas et al., Social Impact Bonds: A New Tool for Social Financing, PRINCETON
U. PUB. POL'Y & INT'L AFF. PROGRAM 8 (2014) (stating that social impact bonds first launched in 2010).
15. Impact Bond Global Database, Soc. FIN., http://sibdatabase.socialfinance.org.uk (last
visited Apr. 20, 2018) (noting that a non-governmental foundation is issuing a social impact bond in Peru,
and governmental entities are issuing social impact bonds in countries like the United States and Canada).
16. Social Impact Bonds Infographic, ROCKEFELLER FOUND. (Sept. 21, 2014),
https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/report/social-impact-bonds-infographic/ (last visited Apr. 16,
2018) (noting that social impact investing can bring "up to $1 trillion in potential commercial capital over
the next ten years" into social programs).
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broad array of government policies that negatively affect their business interests.
Second, this Note shows how social impact bonds could be used to purchase the
right to advance human rights policies. It identifies two legal concepts-indirect
expropriation and fair and equitable treatment-that bondholders could use to
vindicate human rights within the ISDS regime. It also identifies a third legal
concept, the Tokios Tokelds doctrine, which could allow domestic parties to file
claims within the ISDS regime. Third, this Note details the advantages of these
legal strategies-namely, that these strategies can work in the short term and that
the ISDS regime is a potentially powerful, albeit presently under-utilized, tool
for protecting human rights. Finally, this Note concludes by briefly addressing
how the strategies proposed might assist long-term efforts to reform the ISDS
regime.
I. THE ORIGINS OF ISDS AND ITS TRANSFORMATION INTO A DEREGULATORY
TOOL
The following Part describes how companies broadened the reach of the
ISDS regime beyond its initial narrow purpose of protecting against
expropriation into the domain of challenging otherwise pro-human rights
policies that companies feel threaten their private interests. As this Part explains,
this evolution was made easier by the fact that the boundary between policies
that expropriate property and policies that harm business interests is blurry. This
Note argues that investors can advance human rights through the ISDS regime
by deploying the same legal tactics that companies have already pioneered. As
such, this Part provides important background for Part II, where I elaborate
further on the legal claims investors can make to vindicate human rights.
Before proceeding, a brief gloss on how this Note uses the term "human
rights." U.S. scholarship typically assumes that "human rights" refers primarily
to civil and political rights,17 such as the right to be free from "arbitrary arrest,
detention or exile."18 However, within international law, human rights refers to
both civil and political rights as well as socioeconomic rights.19 This Note uses
the term to refer to socioeconomic rights, such as environmental rightS20 and the
right to health, housing, and food.21 This is for two reasons. First, as the examples
17. Philip Alston, Economic and Social Rights, 26 STUD. TRANSNAT'L LEGAL POL'Y 137, 137
(1994) ("The phrase 'economic and social rights' is rarely used by commentators in the United States.").
18. G.A. Res. 217 (111) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. IX (Dec. 10, 1948).
19. See JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 40-54 (3d ed.
2013) (discussing the place of socioeconomic rights within human rights law); see also Samuel Moyn,
The Return of the Prodigal: The 1970s as a Turning Point in Human Rights History, in THE
BREAKTHOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 1970s 1, 1-15 (Jan Eckel & Samuel Moyn eds., 2014) (providing
an alternate historical account of the origin of human rights).
20. For a discussion of the role of environmental rights in international human rights law, see
Francesco Francioni, International Human Rights in an Environmental Horizon, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 41,
42-43 (2010) ("Recent practice shows that the protection of the natural environment in special socio-
cultural contexts is a sine qua non for the enjoyment of human rights by members of the relevant group
or community."); and Alan Boyle, Human Rights and the Environment: Where Next?, 23 EUR. J. INT'L L.
3 (2012).
21. Alston, supra note 17, at 137-38 (referring to these rights as "economic, social and cultural
rights" rooted in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).
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below illustrate, companies' ISDS claims have primarily infringed on
socioeconomic rights. As such, this is the set of rights that the ISDS regime most
urgently needs to protect. Second, as will be discussed in Part II, social impact
bonds typically fund projects that advance socioeconomic rights. Since the legal
strategies proposed in this Note hinge on the existence of a social impact bond,
these strategies are best suited to protecting socioeconomic rights.
A. The Origin ofISDS as a Regime for Protecting Against Expropriation
Most accounts of the current ISDS regime trace the regime's roots back to
the 1959 Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments Abroad.2 2 This
Convention was primarily concerned with protecting foreign investors' property
against State attempts to expropriate it. Hermann Abs and Lord Hartley
Shawcross, the Convention's authors, said that the Convention's purpose was to
provide "security of investment."23 It did this by mandating that countries abide
by two legal principles. First, countries had to ensure "fair and equitable
treatment to the property of the nationals of other Parties."24 Second, it mandated
that countries not expropriate property, either directly or indirectly, except in
return for "just and effective compensation."25 To ensure that States abided by
these principles, Article VII(2) of the Convention provided "[a] national of one
of the Parties claiming that he has been injured by measures in breach of this
Convention" with the right to "institute proceedings against the Party responsible
for such measures."26 This article granted investors a private right of action
against States that breached their obligations towards investors' private property
rights. Simon Lester identifies this article as the "precursor to the modem
investor-state procedure."27
Critically, the text of the Convention as well as the historical circumstances
surrounding its creation indicate that it was not crafted with the aim of providing
22. Hermann Abs & Lord Hartley Shawcross, Draft Convention on Investments Abroad, 9 J.
PUB. L. 116, 116-18 (1960) [hereinafter Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention]. Simon Lester's account of
the genesis of the ISDS regime provides a helpful and comprehensive outline for the history in this Note.
Simon Lester, Liberalization or Litigation? Time To Rethink the International Investment Regime, CATO
INST. CTR. FOR TRADE POL'Y STUD. 3 (2013), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/
pdf/pa730 web.pdf ("The Abs-Shawcross convention ... marked the first tentative step towards the
widely adopted, binding set of international investment rules we see today."); see also 0. Thomas Johnson
Jr. & Jonathan Gimblett, From Gunboats to BITs: The Evolution ofModern International Investment Law,
in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2010-2011, at 649 (Karl P. Sauvant ed.,
2011) (providing a historical account of foreign investment protections); Lise Johnson & Lisa Sachs, The
Outsized Costs ofInvestor-State Dispute Settlement, 16 AIB INSIGHTS 10, 10-11 (2016) (suggesting that
the ISDS system may not be all that different from "gunboat diplomacy").
23. Hermann Abs & Lord Hartley Shawcross, Comment on the Draft Convention by its Authors,
9 J. PUB. L. 119, 119 (1960).
24. Abs-Shaweross Draft Convention, supra note 22, art. 1.
25. Id. arts. II-III; see also Lester, supra note 22, at 3 ("Article II provided that any
'undertakings' (i.e., contracts) related to foreign investments must be observed. And Article III dealt with
direct or indirect 'deprivation' of property and required 'just and effective compensation' when that
occurred.").
26. Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention, supra note 22, art. VII(2).
27. Lester, supra note 22, at 3. In contrast to contemporary ISDS provisions, the Abs-Shawcross
Draft Convention required investors to gain the consent of respondent States in order to institute
proceedings. Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention, supra note 22, art. VII(2).
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investors with a right to affect social policy in areas like health, education, and
housing. The Convention's emphasis on protecting "security of investment" is
best understood as a reaction to concerns about the orientation of newly
decolonized regions of the globe towards the property rights of Western
investors.28 Lester notes that the 1950s and 1960s were "a time of increased
assertiveness by less-developed countries (LDCs) over their natural resources,
resulting in the nationalization of a number of foreign operations, along with
various other kind of interference with, and bad treatment of, foreign
companies."29 Because the Convention aimed to ensure that States afforded
investors fair and equitable treatment and just compensation in cases of
expropriation, a commentator writing in 1959 noted that the Abs-Shawcross
Draft Convention was intended to provide a "means of protecting the private
foreign investments of Western capital-exporting nations."30
After the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention, the modern ISDS regime
continued to expand along the same model, focusing on protecting property
against expropriation. The first big steps towards its expansion came through the
spread of BITs and IIAs in the late 1970s and early 1980s.31 However, ISDS only
became a commonplace element of the international legal regime in the 1990s.
The NAFTA, including its Chapter 11 ISDS provisions, was signed in December
1993.32 The World Trade Organization came into existence at the beginning of
1995, and the number of international economic agreements proliferated. The
number of BITs and IIAs expanded dramatically during this time period. For
example, during the eight-year period between 1994 and 2002, there were
approximately 150 new BITs signed every year.3 4 (From 1980-1991, the number
of BITs signed every year never reached over 100; in 1992 and 1993, there were
a little over 100 BITs signed each year.3 5) While the rate of new BITs and IIAs
has tapered since then, there are about 3,300 active IIAs in the world today.36
While BITs and IIAs spread rapidly in the 1990s, investors only began to
regularly utilize the ISDS provisions within these treaties in the 2000s. Since
28. Lester, supra note 22, at 6 (explaining that the investment principles in the Abs-Shawcross
Draft Convention were a reaction to a "surge in expropriation" in the 1950s).
29. Id. at 2-3 ("[The Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention] marked the first tentative step toward
the widely adopted, binding set of international investment rules we see today.").
30. Editors, Introduction to the Proposed Convention to Protect Private Foreign Investment: A
Round Table, 9 J. PUB. L. 115, 115 (1960); see also Lester, supra note 22, at 3 (discussing the Draft
Convention).
31. Jason W. Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment?
Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 397, 403 (2011).
32. See Bill Clinton, President, Remarks on Signing the North American Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act (Dec 8, 1993), 2 PUB. PAPERS 2193 (1993).
33. The- 128 Countries that Had Signed GATT by 1994, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/gattmeme.htm.
34. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2015: REFORMING
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE 24, fig. 10 (2015) [hereinafter WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT
2015], http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_overview-en.pdf
35. Id.
36. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2017: INVESTMENT
AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY xii, 111 (2017), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2017_en.pdf
(noting that there are currently 3,324 IlAs in the world).
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2004, the number of ISDS claims per year has often exceeded forty. As of
January 2016, there had been a total number of 767 ISDS claims filed against
109 countries.38
As the ISDS regime has expanded its geographic reach, investors have
grown increasingly adept at utilizing its provisions to challenge social policies
that otherwise harm their business interests. Ethyl's success in 1997 in using an
ISDS claim to convince Canada to abandon its MMT ban is just one notable
example. This Section examines other examples of companies successfully using
ISDS mechanisms to challenge social policies, and then explores the individual
and cumulative effects of these challenges.
B. ISDS Claims and Their Impact on Human Rights
As the ISDS regime expanded geographically, companies began to push
the regime beyond its original narrow focus on expropriation towards a broader
focus on protecting investors against policies that harm their business interests.
To do this, companies have taken advantage of the blurry boundary between
policies that formally expropriate property and those that harm business
interests.39 As such, companies have argued that certain government policies
impermissibly threaten their property interests, even when those policies
otherwise advance human rights. In this way, companies have used the ISDS
regime to deter States from adopting policies that advance socioeconomic rights.
Perhaps the most famous recent example of a company using ISDS
provisions to challenge social policies is Vattenfall.40 In March 2009, Vattenfall,
a Swedish energy company with a planned coal-power plant near the Elbe River,
filed an ISDS claim alleging Germany had expropriated its property and seeking
C1.4 billion in compensation.4 1 The dispute started in 2007 when Germany's
Green Party took control of key positions in Hamburg and decided to conduct an
environmental review of Vaftenfall's proposed power plant.42 The review
concluded that the amount of hot water that the proposed plant would pump into
the Elbe River comprised a threat to the river's health.4 3 As a result, Hamburg
required Vattenfall to take precautionary environmental measures when
operating the plant.4 Vattenfall alleged that these new environmental measures
"destroy[ed] the economic value of the plant." 45 In response to Vattenfall's ISDS
37. Id at 115.
38. Id. States won thirty-six percent of these claims and investors won twenty-seven percent,
while the rest were settled or discontinued.
39. See Part II, infra, for a further discussion of the development of the ISDS doctrine.
40. Vattenfall AB v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6, Request for
Arbitration (Mar. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Vattenfall Request for Arbitration].
41. Id.
42. Sebastian Knauer, Vattenfall vs. Germany: Power Plant Battle Goes to International
Arbitration, SPIEGEL ONLINE: INT'L (July 15, 2009 6:38 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/
germany/vattenfall-vs-germany-power- plant-battle-goes-to-intemational-arbitration-a-636334.html; see
also Case Studies: Investor-State Attacks on Public Interest Policies, PUB. CITIZEN 3 (2014),
http://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/egregious-investor-state-attacks-case-studies_4.pdf
43. Knauer, supra note 42.
44. Id
45. Vattenfall Request for Arbitration, supra note 40, [ 45.
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claim, in 2011 Germany agreed to a settlement with the Swedish energy
company that allowed the company to proceed without the original Elbe River
environmental protections.4 6 The environmental protections contained in the
final agreement were so weak that the European Commission has referred
Germany to the Court of Justice of the European Union for its failure to protect
fish species in the Elbe.47 Buoyed by its success against Hamburg, Vattenfall has
already filed another ISDS claim against Germany relating to its decision to
abandon nuclear energy over safety concerns in the wake of the Fukushima
nuclear disaster.4 8
Private investors have also utilized ISDS provisions to challenge policies
well outside the domain of environmental regulations, including in areas like
health, financial policy, and affirmative action.49 Piero Foresti, an Italian mining
company, filed a claim in 2009 seeking $350 million in compensation from the
South African government for its attempts to implement its Black Economic
Empowerment (BEE) program.50 Under the BEE program, the South African
government required that black South Africans hold a minimum twenty-six
percent ownership stake in mining companies in the country.51 This affirmative
action program was meant to redress the historical wrong of apartheid.52 Piero
Foresti resisted this program, arguing that it would dilute the existing owners'
stake in the company. Ultimately, South Africa signed a settlement agreement
with Piero Foresti that required the company to transfer only a five percent
ownership stake to black South Africans. 5 3 One of the lawyers for Piero Foresti
said that a key reason the government agreed to settle was because it feared that
an adverse decision from the arbitral panel would endanger the entire BEE
program.54
Ethyl's, Vattenfall's, and Piero Foresti's respective victories highlight two
key features of the ISDS regime that make it a particularly powerful tool for
these corporations. First, the ISDS regime provides these corporations with a
mechanism to act directly against countries pursuing policies counter to their
46. Claire Provost & Matt Kennard, The Obscure Legal System that Lets Corporations Sue
Countries, GUARDIAN (June 10, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/10/obscure-legal-
system-lets-corportations-sue-states-ttip-icsid (noting the settlement was also motivated by Vattenfall's
victories in domestic courts).
47. Press Release, European Comm'n, Environment: Commission Refers Germany to Court
over Coal Power Plant in Moorburg (Mar. 26, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_[P-15-
4669_en.htm.
48. NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER & MARTIN DIETRICH BRAUCH, INT'L INST. FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEV., THE STATE OF PLAY IN VATTENFALL V. GERMANYII: LEAVING THE GERMAN PUBLIC
IN THE DARK (2014), http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/state-of-play-vattenfall-vs-
germany-II-leaving-german-public-dark-en.pdf.
49. See Case Studies: Investor-State Attacks on Public Interest Policies, supra note 42
(providing case studies from Canada, Ecuador, and the United States, among others).
50. Provost & Kennard, supra note 46; see also Piero Foresti, Laura di Carli v. Republic of
South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/01, Award (Aug. 4 2010).
51. Provost & Kennard, supra note 46.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. ("'If the merits of the case were decided against the government, they thought, 'That's
it, we are going to go down.' And I think that's why they were happy to agree to that settlement,' Jonathan
Veeran, another of the company's lawyers said, in an interview at his office in Johannesburg.").
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own private interests. Second, ISDS arbitral awards are theoretically enforceable
and, perhaps more importantly, are often enforced in practice." This is so even
in those instances in which governments try to avoid paying. For example, a
German company convinced a German court to seize a Boeing 737 plane owned
by the Thai government in order to collect on a $43 million ISDS arbitral
award.56 In most cases, however, prevailing investors do not need to seek to
enforce a judgment against a State because governments that refuse to honor
awards may risk their access to international markets. As a result, one 2008
study found that "81 percent of participating corporations did not enforce or seek
to enforce arbitral awards against States, namely because of high rates of
voluntary compliance and the negotiation of post-award settlements."5' This
means that governments must, and typically do, take corporations' ISDS claims
seriously. If governments fail to do so, they risk legal losses that could easily
translate into fiscal and economic pain.
Because investors' individual ISDS claims pose real threats to countries,
they serve to focus the minds of governments that are pursuing pro-human rights
policies contrary to the companies' private interests. The examples of Ethyl,
Vattenfall, and Piero Foresti all show that companies have been able to convince
governments in both the Global North and South to reverse policy choices
without prevailing in front of an arbitral panel. Often, an ISDS claim alone will
force the government to the negotiating table, providing a company with a
critical leverage point to achieve its aims.
While each company's ISDS claim can be powerful in its own right,
cumulatively these claims have worked to create a policy environment hat deters
governments from even attempting to pursue pro-human rights policies in the
first place. Gus van Harten and Dayna Nadine Scott argue that companies' usage
of ISDS procedures to challenge social policies is leading to "regulatory chill."5 9
55. See, e.g., ICSID Convention, supra note 9, art. 54(1) ("Each Contracting State shall
recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations
imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State.");
Catherine M. Amirfar, Dispute Settlement Clauses in Investor-State Arbitration: An Informed Approach
to Empirical Studies About Law: A Response to Professor Yackee, 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 303, 310
(2014).
56. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PUBLIC
CONSULTATION: 16 MAY-9 JULY 2012, at 30 ¶¶ 67-68 (2012), http://www.oecd.org/investment/
internationalinvestmentagreements/50291642.pdf (noting various methods that investors can use to
enforce awards); see also Amirfar, supra note 55, at 310 (detailing the international treaty regime that
permits ISDS arbitral awards to be enforced in domestic courts).
57. See Amirfar, supra note 55, at 310 (noting that States comply with ISDS awards in order to
maintain access to international markets); Come and Get Me: Argentina is Putting International
Arbitration to the Test, ECONOMIST, (Feb. 18, 2012) https://www.economist.com/node/21547836
(suggesting that Argentina may lose access to international markets if it does not honor international
arbitral awards).
58. Amirfar, supra note 55, at 310
59. Gus van Harten & Dayna Nadine Scott, Investment Treaties and Internal Vetting of
Regulatory Proposals: A Case Study From Canada 1 (Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper No. 26,
2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2700238; see also Lise Johnson, Lisa Sachs &
Jeffrey Sachs, Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Public Interest and US. Domestic Law, COLUMBIA CTR.
ON SUSTAINABLE INV. 2-3 (2015), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/05/Investor-State-Dispute-
Settlement-Public-Interest-and-U.S.-Domestic-Law-FINAL-May-19-8.pdf (arguing that ISDS leads to
regulatory chill); Eckhard Janeba, Regulatory Chill and the Effect of Investor State Dispute Settlements
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Van Harten and Scott note that "ISDS creates incentives for states to avoid or
modify their regulatory decisions because of a risk of foreign investor claims and
monetary awards."60 When deciding whether or not to regulate, governments
must weigh the costs of regulating against the potential benefits of doing so.
When governments consider the potential litigation costs from ISDS claims as a
decisive thumb on the scale, they will systematically choose not to regulate. Van
Harten and Scott describe this phenomenon as "regulatory chill."
While there has not been quantitative work to analyze whether this
phenomenon is actually occurring, van Harten and Scott provide compelling
qualitative evidence to show that it is. In a 2016 study, van Harten and Scott
reported their findings from fifty-one interviews with government officials in
Ontario.61 The study occurred after Canada had been sued thirty-six times under
the NAFTA's ISDS provisions.6 2 Their study showed that after Ontario's Trade
Ministry became increasingly aware of the risks of ISDS litigation, the Ministry
pushed to implement a "trade policy screen" for almost any policy proposal
being submitted to the cabinet.63 The Trade Ministry claims that the purpose of
this trade policy screen is to ensure that the Cabinet is aware of ISDS-associated
litigation risk stemming from any major policy decisions.6 4 However, other
government officials expressed skepticism about this screen, arguing that its true
purpose is to allow Trade Ministry officials to gather input from industry special
interests who might be affected by a specific policy.65 This can be seen as two
sides of the same coin: for the "trade policy screen" to be effective, officials may
need to engage with industry interests in order to determine how they might react
to a specific policy. Furthermore, van Harten shows that ISDS is seeping deeper
into the government of Ontario's decision-making process. For example, after
an environment-related ministry in Ontario was itself the subject of an ISDS
claim, that ministry started developing its own expertise in assessing ISDS-
related litigation risk.66 Although van Harten's study does not show that ISDS-
related litigation risk has become a decisive thumb on the scale, it shows that this
factor is being consistently introduced into the decision-making process.
Because companies are the primary parties using ISDS mechanisms to
challenge social policies, this creates a unidirectional regulatory chill.
Governments only have to factor ISDS-related risks into their decision-making
(Ctr. for Econ. Studies & Ifo Inst. Working Paper Series No. 6188, 2016),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract-id=2887952 (providing a mathematical model for
determining when regulatory chill is most likely to occur under different approaches to making ISDS
available).
60. Van Harten & Scott, supra note 59, at 1 ("The fear is usually linked to the exclusive access
of foreign investors to ISDS, the inability of states to bring claims against foreign investors, the breadth
of foreign investor protections in ISDS, the weaknesses of exceptions to protect the right to regulate, the
ability of foreign investors to receive uncapped amounts of compensation from the state, the international
enforceability of ISDS awards, or the absence of conventional judicial safeguards in ISDS.").
61. Id.
62. Id. at 3.
63. Id. at 14-15.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 18-19.
66. Id. at 19-23.
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when they are considering a regulation that will negatively impact business
interests. However, when governments are considering an action that will
support business, they need not fear ISDS litigation. Since, as van Harten and
Scott's research suggests, policymakers are becoming habituated to considering
ISDS risk in decision-making, the absence of ISDS risk may make certain
policies look relatively even more attractive. Thus, the ISDS regime creates an
imbalance in the policy environment by raising the cost of pursuing policies that
advance a human rights agenda but may hurt business interests.
This need not be the case. If parties were able to coopt the legal strategies
that companies have previously used for the new purpose of advancing human
rights instead, this would help push States to maintain pro-human rights policies.
Part II further develops this argument.
II. PURCHASING THE LEGAL RIGHT TO USE ISDS To FURTHER SOCIAL RIGHTS
As the ISDS regime has expanded to adjudicate disputes touching on
human rights, its legitimacy to do so has increasingly been called into question.67
For example, the United Nations' independent expert on the promotion of a
democratic and equitable international order, Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, has said
that "the international investment agreement regime poses grave dangers to the
enjoyment of human rights."68 As a result, States, practitioners, scholars, and
civil society organizations have argued for reforms to the ISDS regime, or for
the need to end it altogether.69 This Note does not engage directly in this rich
debate on the relative (de)merits of the ISDS regime.
Rather, this Note makes a novel intervention in an ongoing debate about
how the ISDS regime might be utilized to advance human rights. To date, most
of the attention on how to sensitize the ISDS regime to human rights has ignored
the potential role of investors. Scholars like Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, and Francesco Francioni have gathered suggestions about how host
States or amici curiae can help make ISDS tribunals aware of the human rights
67. See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Introduction and Summary: "Administration ofJustice"
in International Investment Law and Adjudication?, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW AND ARBITRATION 3, 3 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Francesco Francioni & Emst-Ulrich Petersmann eds.,
2009) (noting that ISDS's "output-legitimacy (for example, in terms of serving the general interests of all
stakeholders rather than one-sidedly favoring investor interests) . . . remain[s] controversial among
governments, lawyers, and civil society"); Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for
Human Rights?, 60 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 573, 575 (2011) (noting that a number of Latin American
countries' actions show that concerns about the ISDS regime's legitimacy are real).
68. De Zayas, supra note 8, 16; see also Johnson, Sachs & Sachs, supra note 59, at 1
("Multinational companies are increasingly using ISDS to challenge the legal and regulatory systems and
policy choices of the contracting states, posing a serious and growing risk to the ability of states to govern
in the public interest.").
69. See, e.g., Daniel J. Ikenson, A Compromise To Advance the Trade Agenda: Purge
Negotiations of Investor-State Dispute Settlement, CATO INST. (Mar. 4, 2014),
http://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/compromise-advance-trade-agenda-purge-
negotiations-investor-state (arguing for "purging" ISDS from the trade agenda); Open Letter from Payam
Akhavan, Associate Professor, McGill Univ. Faculty of Law, et al. to Mitch McConnell, Majority Leader,
U.S. Senate, et al. (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.mcgill.ca/fortier-chair/isds-open-letter (arguing in favor of
the ISDS regime despite some problems with it); Resnik, supra note 7 (arguing for eliminating ISDS
provisions from the Trans-Pacific Partnership).
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at stake in a case.7 0 International Court of Justice Judge Bruno Simma has also
argued that tribunals could take advantage of existing jurisprudence to allow host
States to assert human rights defenses, or to oblige investors to better understand
the human rights obligations of host States before undertaking an investment.
That is not to say that investors have been altogether ignored. For example,
Filip Balcerzak recently published a collection of cases in which investors sought
to root their claims against host States' as violations of their individual human
rights, because investors were tortured or otherwise denied due process of law.72
While Balcerzak's work shows that investors can successfully make human
rights claims within the ISDS system, the cases he documents suggest that
investors typically do so in reaction to egregious government actions against
investors themselves. Such cases do little to open up space for States to comply
with their human rights obligations to their own population by counteracting the
unidirectional regulatory chill ISDS has created.
To the best of my knowledge, this Note is the first attempt to show how
investors might intentionally and systematically seek to utilize the ISDS regime
in order to advance the human rights of others. As I discuss further in this Part,
reforming or eliminating the ISDS regime is a long-term project. This Note
nonetheless shows how private actors might begin repurposing the ISDS regime
to compel States to uphold their human rights obligations on a large scale. This
Part argues that social impact investors can do so by purchasing social impact
bonds and gaining the right to use the ISDS regime to advance human rights.
This Part then outlines two legal concepts-indirect expropriation and fair and
equitable treatment-that bondholders can deploy to make claims within the
ISDS regime. A third legal concept, the Tokios Tokelds doctrine, is then
presented as another avenue that domestic parties might pursue within the ISDS
regime.
A. The Possibilities of Social Impact Bonds
The types of investors that can use the ISDS regime to protect human rights
must have three characteristics.74 First, they must qualify as an investor with an
investment covered by the terms of the relevant treaty. Second, they need to be
70. See James Harrison, Human Rights Arguments in Amicus Curiae Submissions: Promoting
Social Justice?, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION, supra note
67, at 396; Petersmann, supra note 67, at 3; Valentina Sara Vadi, Reconciling Public Health and Investor
Rights: The Case of Tobacco, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
ARBITRATION, supra note 67, at 452.
71. Simma, supra note 67, at 575.
72. FILIP BALCERZAK, INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 73-96 (2017)
(referring, for example, to the Bozbey case where an investor was tortured, and the Tulip case where an
investor was denied due process in legal proceedings against him).
73. See, e.g., id. at 90-95 (discussing investors' successes in convincing tribunals to consider
the investors' human rights in in the Tulip and Al-Warraq cases).
74. There have been instances where corporations have, seemingly by happenstance, filed
claims that would likely have a pro-human rights outcome. One recent example is Al Jazeera's claim
against Egypt for suppressing free speech. The First ICSID Case of 2016: Al Jazeera v. Egypt,
STOCKHOLM CHAMBER COM.: ISDS BLOG (Feb. 1, 2016), http://isdsblog.com/2016/02/01/the-first-icsid-
case-of-2016-al-jazeera-v-egyt. This Note seeks to identify investors and domestic communities that
could intentionally pursue such claims on a systematic basis.
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relatively substantial investors or else they will not have the leverage necessary
to influence public policies. Because ISDS tribunals rarely provide specific
performance remedies,75 investors' influence is most likely tied to the size of
their claim. (The size of Ethyl's $251 million claim likely helped focus the mind
of the Canadian government, for example.) Investors pursuing this strategy will
also need to be able to fund the legal costs of a claim, which are typically $1.5
to $2.5 million. Third, the investors' claims must be tied to a particular shift in
public policy. An investor affected by a shift in environmental regulation cannot
bring a claim related to healthcare regulations, for example. But she could bring
a claim based on a shift in environmental regulations. Would it be possible to
find a party who is (1) an investor with a (2) substantial investment that is (3)
tied to particular social policy?
Companies and large pension funds are two categories of investors that
meet the three criteria outlined above. One obvious way to convince such bodies
to pursue a pro-human rights claim would be through more "traditional"
shareholder activism of the sort that has helped pressure companies to become
more environmentally and socially aware. This strategy, however, is limited in
two respects. First, companies and pension funds would need to have an
investment that is threatened by the end of an important policy or regulation in
order to bring a claim. Yet, as recent trends in ISDS claims show, their
commercial interests often run counter to a pro-human rights agenda. Second,
such traditional shareholder activism is unlikely to be politically feasible.77 This
is because, even if a company were to successfully pursue a claim through ISDS
mechanisms, countries might punish investors for their perceived hostility in
doing so.78 The risks to companies and pension funds of pursuing pro-human
rights claims are high, and therefore resistance from within these organizations
will be strong.
75. See CHRISTOPHER F. DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 570 (2008) ("Most
arbitral rules do not restrain the power of tribunals [with regard to enforcing specific performance].
However, Article 54(1) of the ICSID Convention, which obliges the state parties to recognize as binding
awards rendered under the Convention, limits this obligation to the enforcement of 'pecuniary
obligations."' (citation omitted)). Dugan also notes that Aaron "Ronnie" Broches, largely recognized as
the creator of ICSID, intended only for monetary remedies to be enforceable.
76. Rachel Thorn & Jennifer Doucleff, Disregarding the Corporate Veil and Denial ofBenefits
Clauses: Testing Treaty Language and the Concept of "Investor," in THE BACKLASH AGAINST
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 3, 5 n.4 (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010) ("A
recent survey of awards suggests that states incur between US$1.5 and US$2.5 million defending
investment claims . . .. [T]he average amount claimed was approximately US$323.4 million, although
the average amount award was substantially less (US$10.4 million).").
77. In some instances, companies have joined together to call on governments to take action on
a matter of common concern, such as the environment. See Michael Hutchinson & Georgina Seward,
Shareholder Activism: The New Face of Environmental Lobbying, MAYER BROWN LLP (Jan. 2010),
http://m.mayerbrown.com/publications/shareholder-activism-the-new-face-of-environmental-lobbying-
01-22-2010. Such corporate activism arguably creates reputational benefits and adds to overall profit.
However, this is a far cry from convincing a corporation to expend resources in directly challenging a
foreign government in court.
78. See Malcolm Langford, Daniel Behn & Ole Kristian Fauchald, Tempest in a Teapot? The
International Investment Regime and State Backlash (PluriCourts Research Paper No. 15-22, 2015),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2704344 (citing examples of the governments of
Zimbabwe, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, and Bolivia initiating criminal proceedings against companies that
have filed ISDS claims).
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Given that more traditional investors are unlikely to pursue pro-human
rights ISDS claims, this Note seeks to identify other classes of investors that
could. This Section argues that the jurisprudence of the ISDS regime has
expanded so broadly that social impact investors already exist who could file
claims to pressure governments to maintain pro-human rights policies. By
buying social impact bonds, investors can purchase the right to file claims against
governments seeking to eliminate or degrade social programs. The legal
strategies for advancing these claims, and the potential causes of action, are
detailed in Sections II.C and II.D.
In recent years, investors have paid increasing attention to the market
potential of low-income consumers. A new class of so-called social impact
investors has grown in pursuit of opportunities with mixed social and financial
profit. 79 While such opportunities sometimes provide market rates of return,
more typically they only provide sub-market rates of return in exchange for the
opportunity to provide a social benefit.80 The global appetite for such social
impact investments is increasing. For example, the Investors' Council of the
Global Impact Investing Network has reported that social impact funds now
manage $60 billion in assets.8 1
These investors often have a strong financial and social interest in the
policies of the States in which they invest. Their assets serve sectors like
affordable housing, agriculture, education, energy, and the environment.8 2 Their
investments often go into businesses in low-income communities or enterprises
serving the bottom of the pyramid.8 3 This means their investments are linked to
the successes of low-income communities. In many cases, therefore, impact
investors have taken a financial bet that depends on a government protecting or
expanding its social policies for poor and marginalized groups.
Social impact bonds, also known as development impact bonds, represent
such a class. The first social impact bond was the 2010 Peterborough Social
Impact Bond to reduce prisoner recidivism at H.M. Prison Peterborough in the
United Kingdom ("HMP Peterborough").84 For that bond, the U.K. Ministry of
Justice recognized that it could save money if it were able to reduce prisoner
recidivism, or the rate at which prisoners reoffend and return to prison. As a
result, the Ministry of Justice, in conjunction with the Big Lottery Fund, issued
79. What You Need To Know About Impact Investing: What Is Impact Investing?, GLOBAL
IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK, http://thegiin.org/impact-investing/need-to-know (last visited Apr. 20,
2018) ("Impact investments are investments made into companies, organizations, and funds with the
intention to generate social and environmental impact alongside a financial return."); see also Tina
Rosenberg, Issuing Bonds To Invest in People, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2018),
http://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/06/opinion/social-projects-investing-bonds.html.
80. See GLOBAL IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK, supra note 79.
81. J.P. MORGAN & GLOBAL IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK, EYES ON THE HORIZON: THE
IMPACT INVESTOR SURVEY 5 (2015),
http://thegiin.org/assets/documents/pub/2015.04%2OEyes%20on%20the%20Horizon.pdf.
82. Id. at 6.
83. Id.
84. EMMA DISLEY, CHRIS GIACOMANTONIO, KRISY KRUITHOF & MEGAN SIM, THE PAYMENT
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a social impact bond to fund the work of One Service, a post-release prisoner
support program.8 ' The bond was tied to One Service's performance. One
Service worked with different providers and local partners to support offenders
as they exited HMP Peterborough. If One Service reduced recidivism by ten
percent by 2014, bondholders would receive an interest payment.86 An
independent evaluator was responsible for measuring whether One Service had
reached its targets. The interest payment was made out of the money that the
Ministry of Justice saved when fewer ex-convicts returned to prison, along with
some assistance from the Big Lottery Fund. By contrast, if One Service did not
hit this target, then investors did not receive any interest.88
Figure 1: Illustration of Peterborough Social Impact Bond8 9
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Since the HMP Peterborough Bond, the social impact bond industry has
grown dramatically. Both public and private entities in the Global North and
South have issued social impact bonds to fund social programs.90 And, while the
following Sections address a potential bond issued by private parties to fund
malaria prevention in Mozambique, the arguments advanced in the Note apply
equally to social impact bonds issued by governments or private parties from the
Global North or South. As a result of the broad geographic reach of social impact
bonds, the Rockefeller Foundation estimates that there may be a trillion-dollar
commercial market for social impact bonds in the next decade.9 1 Investors are
actively investigating the possible application of the social impact bond model
85. Id. at 11-14.
86. Id.
87. Id at 3.
88. Id.
89. Figure based on id at 12.
90. Impact Bond Global Database, supra note 15 (noting that a nongovernmental foundation is
issuing a social impact bond in Peru and governmental entities are issuing social impact bonds in countries
like the United States and Canada).
91. Social Impact Bonds Infographic, supra note 16.
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to challenges in sectors like health,92 education,9 3 and enterprise development.94
The basic finances of these bonds are all based on the core components of the
HMP Peterborough example: (i) investors pay up front to support a service
provider; (ii) the service provider uses the funds to provide a service measured
against certain targets; and (iii) if the targets are met, a private or public entity
that reaps savings shares some of those savings with investors as a return on their
initial investment.
The growing asset class of social impact bonds is a ready-made vehicle for
purchasing the right to pursue a human rights agenda through ISDS claims.
Consider the holder of a bond to fund anti-malaria spraying in Mozambique.9 5
This bond aims to reach eight million people in Mozambique over ten years.9 6
The bond funds "an integrated malaria control program that addresses all aspects
of prevention, diagnosis, treatment, and monitoring and evaluation."97 Private
corporations working in Mozambique bear a cost for fighting and treating
malaria when their employees fall sick. These costs come in the form of lost
work hours as well as healthcare payments. Therefore, if the integrated malaria
control program succeeds in achieving malaria reduction targets, these private
actors save money. As in the HMP Peterborough example, these savings can be
used to pay back investors their principal plus interest.98 However, if the program
fails to meet its targets, investors lose: "[i]f the malaria interventions are
ineffective, investors are repaid only 50% of their principal, with no interest, the
program terminates, and funders are absolved of further commitments."9 9
These bondholders are likely to qualify as "investors" with "investments"
as defined under most treaties. An "investor" is generally defined to include
juridical and natural persons who are nationals of one of the parties to the
treaty.100 Salini-a dispute concerning whether or not the efforts of two Italian
construction companies to build a fifty kilometer highway in Morocco would
qualify as an investment-is one of the key cases defining "investment" under
92. See id
93. CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEV. & Soc. FIN. LTD., INVESTING IN SOCIAL OUTCOMES:
DEVELOPMENT IMPACT BONDS .52-61 (2013), https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/investing-in-
social-outcomes-development-impact-bonds.pdf
94. Id. at 62-71.
95. The author performed work to support the development of this bond while working for D.
Capital Partners in 2011.






100. Vasyl Chomyi, Marianna Nerushay & Jo-Ann Crawford, A Survey ofInvestment Provisions
in Regional Trade Agreements 13 (World Trade Org. Staff Working Paper No. ERSD-2016-07, 2016),
http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/144182/1/863319661.pdf ("Natural persons that have the
nationality of one of the parties to the agreement under domestic law are typically considered investors in
the other party." (citations omitted)). The U.S. Model BIT helps explain the definition of "investor"
further. An investor is only able to bring claims related to a "covered investment," defined as an
investment by a "foreign" investor in the territory of another party that is a signatory to the treaty that was
"established, acquired or expanded" after the treaty was signed. See U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 12, art.
1. The concept of the "foreign" investor is highly malleable. See infra Section II.E.
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the ICSID Convention, and as such Salini remains a key decision in international
investment jurisprudence.10 1 Under Salini, an investment must typically (i)
include "contributions" of money, assets, or know-how, (ii) have a "certain
duration of performance," (iii) involve "participation in the risks of the
transaction," and, in some instances, (iv) add "to the economic development of
the host State of the investment."l0 2 Later tribunals have understood the Salini
test to include a fifth element, "generation of regular profits and returns."103
Salini suggests any investment that lasts at least two years is likely to pass the
"duration" prong of this test.10 4 While shorter-term investments like contracts for
sale of equipment or contingent liabilities have failed this test, tribunals have
ruled that investments like loans, shares in companies, and promissory notes
qualify under Salini.105
There is a straightforward case that social impact bonds meet Salini's five-
part test for determining if an investment is covered because they (i) are a
contribution of money, (ii) can, and often do, endure for more than two years,
(iii) are intended to help share risk, (iv) are intended to assist with the economic
development of the host country,106 and (v) are made with the expectation of a
financial return. Furthermore, many treaties, such as the U.S. Model BIT10 7 and
the NAFTA, 108 explicitly define an investment to include bonds or debt
securities.109 As discussed further below, bondholders' direct financial stake in
the incidence of malaria in Mozambique provides them with the right to use
ISDS mechanisms to challenge government policies that increase malaria rates.
B. The Potential of Social Impact Investors
Even though social impact investors are likely to be covered under most
treaties, one possible concern is that these investors will not bring ISDS claims
to challenge government policies that have negative social consequences. This
might be because investors have both commercial and social impact investments
in a certain country and do not wish to antagonize the host government.
Alternately, this may be because social impact investors simply do not know
about the legal mechanisms at their disposal.
Notwithstanding these concerns, there is good reason to suspect hat social
101. Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on
Jurisdiction (Jul. 23, 2001), 42 I.L.M. 609 (2003) [hereinafter Salini Decision on Jurisdiction]; see also
Alex Gabrowski, The Definition ofInvestment Under the ICSID Convention: A Defense ofSalini, 15 CHi.
J. INT'L L. 287, 298-99 (2014) (suggesting that the fourth prong of the Salini test has come under attack).
102. Salini Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 101, T 52.
103. DUGAN ET AL., supra note 75, at 260, 269 (listing cases).
104. Salini Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 101, T 54 ("The transaction, therefore, complies
with the minimal length of time upheld by the doctrine, which is from 2 to 5 years.").
105. See DUGAN ET AL., supra note 75, at 250-65.
106. Id. at 272-74 (noting that even projects that are "largely commercial, contractual, or trade-
related in nature" have been considered to meet this prong of the test) (emphasis omitted).
107. See U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 12, art 1.
108. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 1139, Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993) (defining an investment to include a debt security of an enterprise that has a maturity
of at least three years).
109. See Chornyi, Nerushay & Crawford, supra note 100, at 12.
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impact investors are precisely the type of investors who would use ISDS
mechanisms to vindicate human rights claims. Social impact investors, by virtue
of seeking out an investment with a below-market rate of return, have already
demonstrated that they have strong social motivations for their actions.
Furthermore, given that social impact investing is relatively new, many social
impact investors have also proven themselves to enjoy being a first-mover. Thus,
the idea of utilizing their investment for social gain through innovative legal
claims might be appealing.
Moreover, social impact investors are well-positioned to adopt the legal
strategies laid out in this Note. An ISDS claim will be most potent when a
government not only believes that the claim might succeed, but when a
government is also concerned about the size of any award upon victory. For
example, Ethyl's ISDS claim against Canada was for $251 million. In this
respect, because bonds are sold to multiple investors, the structure of the bond
itself groups multiple investors into a single class with a similar interest in
advancing a social policy. Linking bondholders together through a single
financial instrument will help them reach the necessary scale to file a sizeable
ISDS claim. Also, forecasts that the social impact investment sector will reach a
$1 trillion commercial market in the next decade indicate that the financial size
and power of impact investors will grow. 110
Finally, it is worth noting that the impact investing industry is well-
organized through a small number of associations and councils. The
aforementioned Global Impact Investing Network, which manages $60 billion
in assets, is one notable example. Lawyers could work with these associations to
quickly inform impact investors of their legal rights. This would help facilitate
collaboration between investors and lawyers to act strategically to purchase the
right to advance human rights through ISDS mechanisms.
Not only can bondholders therefore coordinate to bring a sizeable enough
ISDS claim to focus the mind of the government, but they also have practical
legal arguments at their disposal in order to do so. The next two Sections describe
two alternative legal theories that have opened up because companies have
expanded the ISDS jurisprudence to accommodate their own claims. Section II.C
argues that bondholders can use the doctrine of indirect expropriation in order to
prevent governments from eliminating needed social programs. Section II.D
argues that bondholders can use the doctrine of fair and equitable treatment to
stop governments from degrading existing programs. While both of these
Sections provide legal paths for bondholders to champion the human rights
concerns of local communities, there are two reasons bondholders hould only
do so in close coordination with domestic constituencies. First, bondholders'
legal strategies are more likely to bring about the desired political change if
paired with domestic political pressure. Second, bondholders who fail to
coordinate with domestic movements risk foisting their own vision of human
rights on the very communities they are trying to assist. However, even if
bondholders do work closely with local communities, it would be best if
110. Social Impact Bonds Infographic, supra note 16.
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domestic communities could act for themselves within the ISDS system. To this
end, Section II.E argues that the Tokios Tokelds doctrine could be used to provide
an onramp for domestic parties to file ISDS claims themselves.
C. Legal Strategy One: Drawing on the Doctrine ofIndirect
Expropriation to Stop Governments from Eliminating Programs
To return to the context of the Mozambican social impact bonds, imagine
if Mozambique tried to undertake efforts to eliminate key anti-malaria resources
or regulations relied upon by the malaria bond-funded program. For example,
the government of Mozambique might decide that it did not want to provide anti-
malarial treatment in the country's restive north."' This would cause a spike in
the national rate of malaria and have a negative effect on the ability of the anti-
malaria control program to reach its targets. Alternatively, Mozambique might
elect a leader who does not believe mosquitos cause malaria and wants to ban all
anti-malarial pesticides from the country. Such a policy would mean that the anti-
malaria control program would need to shut down.12 What then? This Section
explains how bondholders could use the concept of indirect expropriation to
challenge such a policy reversal.
BITs and trade agreements typically allow governments to expropriate
property (i) for a public purpose, (ii) in a non-discriminatory manner, and (iii) in
return for "prompt, adequate and effective compensation.""3 These provisions
relate to both "direct" and "indirect" expropriation.'14 Direct expropriation refers
to the classic scenario in which the government declares it is taking property for
a public purpose.' '5 According to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States, indirect expropriation includes situations in which the
State "subjects alien property to taxation, regulation or other action that is
confiscatory or that prevents, unreasonably interferes with, or unduly delays,
effective enjoyment of an alien's property or its removal from the state's
territory." 16
111. Elsa Buchanan, Mozambique: Towards a New War Between the Frelimo Government and
Renamo Rebels, INT'L Bus. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/mozambique-towards-new-
war-between-frelimo-government-renamo-rebels-1546714 (noting tensions between northern and
southern Mozambique).
112. An analogous scenario in a country in the Global North might be if a country had previously
funded a criminal justice reform project-like efforts to prevent re-incarceration through the HIP
Peterborough Bond-and then a subsequent government wanted to halt such programs. This could happen
because of political shifts, such as was evident in the shift between the Obama and Trump
Administrations' approaches to criminal justice issues.
113. See, e.g., U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 12, art 6(1).
114. See, e.g., id
115. E.g., id., annex B, art. 3 (explaining that "direct expropriation[] [is] where an investment is
nationalized or otherwise directly expropriated through formal transfer of title or outright seizure").
116. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712 cmt. g
(AM. LAW. INST. 1987). "Indirect expropriation" and "fair and equitable treatment" are generally
understood as overlapping but distinguishable concepts. Rudolf Dolzer & Felix Bloch, Indirect
Expropriation: Conceptual Realignments?, 5 INT'L L.F. Du DROIT INT'L 155, 155. While claims under
"fair and equitable treatment" are often premised on a violation of investor expectations, it may be
reasonable to expect investors to foresee the possibility of direct and indirect expropriation. After all,
expropriation is explicitly permitted under certain circumstances in many BITs. See, e.g., U.S. MODEL
BIT, supra note 12, art 6(1). Violating fair and equitable treatment principles is not. As such, the clauses
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Arbitral jurisprudence regarding the concept of indirect expropriation has
bifurcated, with one line of cases standing for a more investor-friendly principle
and the other line standing for a purportedly more State-friendly one.1 17 The
more investor-friendly line of cases instructs the arbitral panel to look solely at
the effect of the government action on the investor.118 The more State-friendly
line of cases allows the arbitral panel to balance the government's purpose for
the alleged indirect expropriation against the effect on the investor.'19 Since a
survey of the existing jurisprudence suggests neither test is dominant, I consider
how investors might bring a claim under both.12 0
The more investor-friendly set of cases is typified by Tippets, which
establishes an "effects-test" for determining whether indirect expropriation has
occurred. In Tippets, the Iranian government installed its own manager within a
U.S. company. The tribunal held that "[t]he intent of the government is less
important than the effects of the measures on the owner, and the form of the
measures of control or interference is less important than the reality of their
impact."1 2 1 Metalclad, a case filed under the NAFTA concerning actions by the
Mexican government that limited a U.S. company's ability to exercise its permit
to operate a hazardous waste landfill, adopts a similar logic.122 Metalclad notes
that "expropriation under NAFTA includes . .. covert or incidental interference
with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the owner . . . of the .
. . economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of
the host State." 2 3
In defining the "effects test," Rudolf Dolzer and Felix Bloch pose the
following question:
Is it of any relevance, for instance, whether a government restricts the right of an
owner with a view to limiting the earning potential of property in general, or whether
the government acts to counter a certain environmental threat and for this purpose
deems itself compelled to limit rights of property owners?124
The "effects" test answers this question in the negative. It does not examine
whether the State had a pro-human rights purpose for its action. As such,
investors seeking to challenge a pro-human rights policy can do so much more
forcefully under the line of cases embodying the Tippets-Metalclad "effects"
regarding expropriation merely seek to ensure that any such State action is (i) in the public interest and
(ii) coupled with "prompt, adequate and effective compensation."
117. See generally Dolzer & Bloch, supra note 116 (providing a detailed exposition of each line
of cases); see also Peter D. Isakoff, Defining the Scope of Indirect Expropriation for International
Investments, 3 GLOBAL Bus. L. REv. 189, 197-200 (2013) (discussing these two lines of cases).
118. Isakoff, supra note 117, at 197-200.
119. Id.
120. Dolzer & Bloch, supra note 116, at 163 ("[I]t does not seem possible to characterize either
of the two approaches as dominant or as representing the mainstream of international thinking.").
121. Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA et al., 6 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 219, 225-
26 (Jun. 22, 1984); see also Dolzer & Bloch, supra note 116, at 161-62 (quoting Tippets).
122. Dolzer & Bloch, supra note 116, at 162.
123. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, T 103
(Aug. 30, 2000) (emphasis added); see also Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada, Interim Award,
7 ICSID Rep. 69 (June 26, 2000) (further discussing the concept of indirect expropriation); Dolzer &
Bloch, supra note 116, at 162-63 (discussing Metalclad).
124. Dolzer & Bloch, supra note 116, at 158.
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test.
In the context of the Mozambican social impact bond, bondholders might
wish to respond to certain government actions by filing a claim under the
definition of indirect expropriation laid out in one of the core cases in the Tippets-
Metalclad line: Biloune v. Ghana.125 Biloune defines indirect expropriation as
government action that "ha[s] the effect of causing the irreparable cessation of
work on the project."126 If the Mozambican government decided to end anti-
malaria efforts, this could cause the "irreparable cessation of work" for the anti-
malaria control program, reducing the value of the bond to zero. This would
likely constitute indirect expropriation.12 7 While the government may seek to
invoke a public interest exception to claims of indirect expropriation, it is
unlikely that such an argument would succeed since the challenged government
action-undermining malaria treatment-is directly contrary to the public
interest. After all, if Ethyl could push Canada to change course even though
Canada did have public interest motivations for its ban on MMT, 12 8 bondholders
should certainly be able to successfully pursue a claim when the government
does not have a public interest motivation for its action.
For similar reasons, bondholders may have a strong argument under the
seemingly more State-friendly line of indirect expropriation cases, which look to
the State's purpose for the challenged action. Peter Isakoff notes that this test can
look for a number of factors, such as whether the State enriched itself or whether
it was targeting a specific investor. Nevertheless, "[m]ore often, tribunals
examine whether a state action promotes the general welfare."'29  The
government's purpose in promoting the general welfare is sometimes balanced
against the harm to the investor.130 In the Mozambican context, investors would
be well positioned to argue that government action extinguishing an anti-malaria
125. Biloune & Marine Drive Complex Ltd. v. Ghana Inv. Ctr. & Gov't of Ghana, UNCITRAL,
Ad Hoc Award on Jurisdiction and Liability (Oct. 27, 1989), 95 I.L.R. 187 (1994) [hereinafter Biloune
Award on Jurisdiction and Liability]; Biloune & Marine Drive Complex Ltd. v. Ghana Inv. Ctr. & Gov't
of Ghana, UNCITRAL, Ad Hoc Award on Damages and Costs (June 30, 1990), 95 I.L.R. 211 (1994).
126. Biloune Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, supra note 125, at 209; see also Dolzer &
Bloch, supra note 116, at 162 (discussing Biloune).
127. If the government moved to end the program itself, investors would have a strong argument
that such a sudden shift in government policy violates fair and equitable treatment. A government shift
towards banning materials necessary for anti-malaria work or banning anti-malaria work in relevant part
of the country would likely violate this standard. The fair and equitable treatment standard is present in
the BIT between Mozambique and the United States. See Treaty Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of Mozambique Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment, Mozam.-U.S., art. II, Dec. 1, 1998, 80 Stat. 271. Such a sudden shift in policy
would prima facie appear to violate the idea of consistency inherent in fair and equitable treatment
principles.
128. Although the merits of that case were never adjudicated, Canada's quick settlement with
Ethyl Corporation was a signal that Canada believed the corporation had a reasonable likelihood of
winning on the merits.
129. Isakoff, supra note 117, at 200; see also L. Yves Fortier & Stephen L. Drymer, Indirect
Expropriation in the Law of International Investment: I Know It When I See It, or Caveat Investor, 19
ICSID REv. 293, 322 (2004) (emphasizing that the tribunal in Feldman v. Mexico stated that, in examining
the purpose of State action, "governments must be free to act in the broader public interest") (quoting
Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, 1 103
(Dec. 16, 2002)).
130. See Fortier & Drymer, supra note 129, at 324-25 (discussing the proportionality principle
in expropriation cases).
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program is counter to the general welfare. This would complicate the
government's ability to argue that its actions were indeed for the general welfare,
and therefore justified.
Even if bondholders' claims against government efforts to eliminate social
programs were never adjudicated in court, the claims would likely serve as a
powerful political too] to focus the minds of governments on the need to change
course. Were Mozambique to stop an essential medical service, it would almost
certainly face dramatic domestic and international pressure.131 The investors'
ISDS claims could help this effort by forcing the government to justify its
policies in arbitral courts and by raising the financial cost to the government for
its anti-health policy choices. If coordinated with domestic constituencies, the
claims might help protect human rights at a critical moment in the country's
history.
D. Legal Strategy Two: Litigating Human Rights Claims Using the
Doctrine of Fair and Equitable Treatment
What if a government decides that rather than eliminating a needed social
program, as described in the hypothetical above, it will merely seek to defund a
social program or degrade it? This Section provides a theory of how the doctrine
of fair and equitable treatment could be used to press claims against such
government policies.
The 2003 case of Tecmed v. Mexico is foundational for understanding how
the principle of fair and equitable treatment came to provide a basis for investor
complaints against a broad set of government actions.132 Tecmed stems from a
disagreement between Tecmed and the Mexican government over the
government's decision not to renew the company's operating license. Rudolf
Dolzer notes that Tecmed is famous for helping to make "investor expectations"
into a "central pillar" of the concept of fair and equitable treatment.133 Tecmed
states:
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that this [fair and equitable treatment] provision of
the Agreement . . . requires the Contracting Parties to provide to international
investments treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into
account by the foreign investor to make the investment. The foreign investor expects
the host State to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally
transparently in its relation with the foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand
131. See, e.g., TREATMENT ACTION CAMPAIGN, http://tac.org.za (last visited Apr. 20, 2018)
(providing an example of a mass-social movement in response to the efforts of the South African
government to prevent people with HIV/AIDS from receiving needed treatment).
132. Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 29,2003) [hereinafter Teemed Award]. Rudolf Dolzer's analysis of Tecmed
and related cases was critical to this Section. See Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Today's
Contours, 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 7, 17-18 (2014).
133. Rudolf Dolzer has tracked the evolution of fair and equitable treatment since Tecmed and
identified seven broad concepts that it encompasses: "good faith in the conduct of a party, consistency of
conduct, transparency of rules, recognition of the scope and purpose of laws, due process, prohibition of
harassment, a reasonable degree of stability and predictability of the legal system, and, in particular,
recognition of the legitimate expectation on the part of the investor." Dolzer, supra note 132, at 15. He
notes that "legitimate expectation on the part of the investor"-referred to in this Note as "investor
expectations"-is the "central pillar." Id. at 17.
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any and all rules and regulations that will govern its investments, as well as the goals
of the relevant policies and administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan
its investment and comply with such regulations. . . . The foreign investor also
expects the host State to act consistently, i.e. without arbitrarily revoking any
preexisting decisions or permits issued by the State that were relied upon by the
investor to assume its commitments as well as to plan and launch its commercial and
business activities. 134
As defined by Tecmed, any claimant seeking to prove a violation of investor
expectations will need to prove (i) that the investor relied on her expectations
about the State's future actions in planning or launching her business; (ii) that
the State changed its action contrary to investor expectations; and (iii) that this
change was "arbitrary." "Arbitrary" is subsequently defined as "presenting
insufficiencies that would be recognized . . . 'by any reasonable and impartial
man,' . . . as being contrary to the law because[] '. . . (it) shocks, or at least
surprises, a sense of juridical propriety."'l
35
Tecmed's expansive definition of "investor expectations" is important in
the development of ISDS jurisprudence for two reasons. First, to the extent
policymakers are aware of ISDS's underlying doctrine, Tecmed tilts the arbitral
scales against any change in public policy. This is because States can comply
with the Tecmed rule and act "consistently" simply by maintaining the status quo
at the moment they receive a foreign investment. It is only when a State deviates
from the status quo that an investor could have a potential claim. In this way, the
Tecmed principle can be seen as fostering regulatory freeze1 36 and ensuring the
stable, unchanging regulatory environment that business tends to prefer.13 7
A second reason Tecmed is significant is that it spurred a line of cases that
have further interpreted the threshold for establishing "investor expectations."l3 8
Marc Jacob and Stephan Schill have noted that some tribunals have only been
willing to examine a fair and equitable treatment claim if a "quasi-contractual
relationship between the State and the investor" exists.139 However, other
tribunals have been willing to adopt a much more relaxed standard, and have
been willing to consider the general regulatory environment that existed at the
time of the investment as relevant to establishing a violation of fair and equitable
treatment principles.'40
134. Tecmed Award, supra note 132, ¶ 154 (emphasis added).
135. Id. (footnotes omitted).
136. See Grewal, supra note 13 (stating that ISDS's indirect expropriation and fair and equitable
treatment jurisprudence has led to "regulatory chill").
137. See, e.g., Infrastructure Investment: Bridging the Gap Between Public and Investor Needs
BLACKROCK 1 (Nov. 2015), http://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-za/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-
infrastructure-investment-november-2015.pdf (stating that "develop[ing] a stable and consistent
regulatory environment for infrastructure investment" will help strengthen "private capital markets[']
investment in infrastructure").
138. Dolzer, supra note 132, at 18 (noting that, after Tecmed, "in a series of decisions, arbitral
jurisprudence has unfolded the essence of fair and equitable treatment and has identified the significance
of legitimate expectations for understanding the standard") (citations omitted).
139. Marc Jacob & Stephan W. Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Content, Practice, Method
26 (Amsterdam Ctr. for Int'l Law, Research Paper No. 2017-20, 2015), http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=2933425.
140. Id at 26-27 (citing relevant cases); see Grewal, supra note 13 ("Regulations that diminish
the value of foreign investors' private property.are frequently the subject of regulatory disputes alleging
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For example, Suez v. Argentina, a dispute over Argentina's decision to alter
the tariff rates affecting the Suez company, notes that arbitrators considering the
concept of investor expectations must ask themselves, "What would have been
the legitimate and reasonable expectations of a reasonable investor in the
position of the Claimants, at the time they made their investment . . . ?"141
National Grid provides guidance to arbitrators considering this question by
indicating that the reasonable investor can build his or her expectations based on
the "context in which the investment was made."1 4 2 Subsequent panel decisions
have read this criterion to include a broad set of contextual factors; National Grid
itself shows that relevant contextual factors can include presidential statements
about the government's purpose in allowing investments generally.143 In the case
of TransCanada's recent claim regarding the Keystone XL pipeline, Cory Adkins
and David Singh Grewal note that TransCanada had argued that its interpretation
of the U.S. Constitution could serve as the basis for its own investor
expectations.14 4 Given the expansiveness of the investor expectations test and its
centrality to fair and equitable treatment, it is unsurprising that Dolzer refers to
the concept of fair and equitable treatment as the "broadest of all" the substantive
standards contained in most BITs and IIAs. 14 5
Despite the investor-friendly nature of Tecmed and its progeny, arbitral
tribunals have noted a public interest defense to claims that a State has violated
the fair and equitable treatment standard.146 For example, National Grid notes
that investors' expectations must "rise to the level of legitimacy and
reasonableness" in that "the host State's legitimate right subsequently to regulate
domestic matters in the public interest must be taken into consideration as
well." 14 7 This public interest defense is theoretically powerful when investors'
claims are in tension with a public policy goal-as with Phillip Morris' argument
'indirect expropriation' as well as a failure of fair and equitable treatment.").
141. Suez v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, 1 228 (July
30, 2010); see also Dolzer, supra note 132, at 19 (discussing Suez).
142. National Grid P.L.C. v. Argentine Republic, Award, $ 175 (Nov. 3, 2008) [hereinafter
National Grid Award].
143. Id. T 176.
144. Cory Adkins & David Singh Grewal, Democracy and Legitimacy in Investor-State
Arbitration, 126 YALE L.J. F. 65, 75 (2016) ("To those readers unfamiliar with the operation of investor-
state dispute resolution, it may seem strange to charge an ad hoc investment tribunal with deciding the
legality of the State Department's actions under the U.S. Constitution or an Executive Order. But
TransCanada can point to a growing body of investment arbitration awards that base violations of
investor's legitimate expectations on interpretations of domestic law."). TransCanada subsequently
withdrew its ISDS claim after the Trump Administration signaled its willingness to approve the Keystone
XL pipeline. See TransCanada Suspends $15-Billion NAFTA Suit on Keystone XL Pipeline, STAR (Feb.
28, 2017) https://www.thestar.com/business/2017/02/28/transcanada-suspends-15-billion-nafta-suit-on-
keystone-xl-pipeline.html.
145. Dolzer, supra note 132, at 10.
146. There are two other limits on the concept. First, to make a claim that the State violated
"investor expectations," the investor must have relied upon its (now violated) expectations when making
its investment. See Tecmed Award, supra note 132, 1 154. Second, there is a presumption against using
"investor expectations" to "[shield investors] from the ordinary business risk of the investment." National
Grid Award, supra note 142, T 175.
147. National Grid Award, supra note 142, 1 175 (quoting Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech
Republic, Partial Award, ¶¶ 304-05 (Mar. 17, 2006)).
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against tobacco regulations in Uruguay, for example.14 8 However, as Canada's
behavior with regards to Ethyl shows, States may not trust that an arbitral panel
will uphold a public interest defense.14 9 Like Canada, States may prefer to settle
out of court and reverse the policy rather than take their chances before the panel.
Thus, the public interest defense may be practically impotent as a protection
against attacks on States' pro-human rights policies.
Social impact investors could use the expansive Tecmed doctrine to
advance human rights. The example of the Mozambique malaria bond illustrates
how this might work in practice. In the context of Mozambique, the government
may have influence over the supply of anti-malaria medications to clinics. It may
also be responsible for controlling the quality of medications entering its market
and for preventing theft or diversion of medications along its supply chain. There
is a strong social interest in ensuring the government maintains these health
systems. A failure to maintain medical supply chains could have implications
beyond malaria. For example, a breakdown in anti-fraud measures could allow
fake anti-retroviral medications to enter the market. Alternately, theft along the
supply chain may create shortages for multiple classes of drugs.
It is possible to imagine two scenarios by which the government might
degrade the national medical supply chain. First, it might fail to ensure that a
sufficient quantity of anti-malaria medications moves through the country.
Second, it might fail to provide quality control, such that many fraudulent or
faulty anti-malaria medications enter the supply chain. Degraded medical supply
chains would deprive the anti-malaria control program funded by the bond of
needed medications. This might lead to a spike in the rate of malaria in the
country, meaning the program would not hit its malaria control targets.
Depending on the severity of the problem, this could reduce the value of the
bondholders' assets to zero.
In such a situation, bondholders could invoke Tecmed to argue that the
government's actions constitute a violation of fair and equitable treatment. Under
Tecmed, States have an obligation to act "consistently" and with regard to the
"basic expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor" when
making the investment.50 Even if investors cannot argue that they expected the
medical supply chain to strengthen after they made their investment, they could
plausibly argue that they could not have reasonably expected it would weaken.
Thus, weakening the supply chain could constitute a violation of investors'
reasonable expectations at the time of investment. For example, to support their
claim, the investors could point to National Grid's instruction that investment
expectations are rooted in the "context in which the investment was made." As
noted earlier, National Grid indicates that presidential statements can serve as
148. See Philip Morris Sues Uruguay Over Graphic Cigarette Packaging, NPR (Sept. 15,2014),
https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2014/09/15/345540221/philip-morris-sues-uruguay-over-
graphic-cigarette-packaging.
149. In this case, Ethyl filed under a theory of indirect expropriation. See Ethyl Corp. Award,
supra note 1, ¶ 7. As explained in the Section immediately below, there is a public interest defense against
a claim of indirect expropriation.
150. Teemed Award, supra note 132, 1 154.
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the basis for investor expectations.'51 Even if many social impact bonds are not
tied to government financing, they are often issued pursuant to a government's
political commitment to provide funding to a needed social program.152
Government statements expressing this sentiment may strengthen investors'
arguments that they reasonably expected the country to maintain the quality of
social services within a particular area, such as anti-malaria work. Any
government deviation from this commitment could constitute a violation of
investors' reasonable expectations and, by extension, a violation of fair and
equitable treatment.
Investors' arguments that worsening social services constitutes a violation
of fair and equitable treatment would find support in TCW v. Dominican
Republic.1 53 This case stems from a concession agreement that TCW had
received from the Dominican Republic to provide electricity on the island. TCW
brought a series of claims under the Dominican Republic-Central American Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) relating to the Dominican Republic's behavior
regarding this concession. It claimed that the Dominican Republic had failed to
"use its sovereign power to effective[ly] enforce existing laws criminalizing the
theft of electricity and to provide [TCW] the legal protection necessary to collect
its bills for electricity."1 54 TCW argued that the Dominican Republic had
violated the fair and equitable treatment protections afforded to investors in the
CAFTA-DR treaty because it had repeatedly represented it would curb
electricity theft in the sector but failed to take action to do so.155 Though the
arbitral panel never reached the merits of this argument, the Dominican Republic
settled with TCW and a group of other, similar claimants for $26 million. 156
This case is significant in two ways. First, it suggests that if bondholders
are able to secure representations from the government o maintain strong health
systems-and the government later deviates from this promise-then the
bondholders may have a colorable claim that the government violated fair and
equitable treatment principles.15 1 Second, it shows that even the threat of a
151. National Grid Award, supra note 142, ¶¶ 176-77.
152. With the Peterborough Social Impact Bond in the U.K., for example, the Justice Secretary
indicated that reducing the recidivism rate was a political priority. Nicholas Timmins, Bond Project Aims
To Cut Rate of Reoffending, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.ft.com/content/35123f02-bc5c- I ldf-
a42b-00144feab49a.
153. TCW Group, Inc. & Dominican Energy Holdings, L.P. v. Dominican Republic, Amended
Notice of Arbitration & Statement of Claim (June 17, 2008).
154. Id. ¶ 9(f).
155. These standards included an "obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil or
administrative adjudicatory proceedings" as well as "full protection and security." Id ¶¶ 133-35 (thereby
finding that the Dominican Republic had violated the fair and equitable treatment obligation under
CAFTA-DR).
156. Luke Eric Peterson, Dominican Republic Settles Trio ofElectricity Arbitrations, INV. ARB.
REP. (Sept. 19, 2009), http://www.iareporter.com/articles/dominican-republic-settles-trio-of-electricity-
arbitrations.
157. Even if private corporations issue the social impact bonds, they may do so conditional on
such government statements. The government may be induced to make such a statement so as to secure
additional funding for malaria treatment. Of course, successive governments might deviate from the
promise to vigorously combat malaria by defunding or degrading such programs. Similarly, a government
might commit to funding healthcare efforts, and successive governments might seek to defund such
efforts. Such a scenario can be seen in the transition between the Obama and Trump Administrations.
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relatively modest $26 million claim can win results. Thus, even if investors may
not ultimately prevail before an arbitral panel, their ability to build a colorable
claim may be enough to force the government o the negotiating table. By
coordinating with domestic activists, investors may be able build a political and
legal strategy to push the government into maintaining its previous levels of
service provision. In this way, bondholders' ISDS claims may be a tool to combat
backsliding by governments that start defunding or degrading social services.
E. Legal Strategy Three: Using Tokios Tokelds to Include Domestic
Parties in the ISDS Regime
By purchasing a social impact bond, investors can purchase the right to
advocate for the policies they desire through ISDS provisions. However, this
does not necessarily mean that they will advocate for the policies that
communities desire. The gap between investor and community aims may be
particularly strong when the investor is from the Global North and the
community is in the Global South, as in the Mozambican example above. For
this reason, investors seeking to advance human rights claims through ISDS
mechanisms should do so in close coordination with social movements and
domestic parties affected by the challenged government actions.
To ensure domestic communities' priorities are properly represented,
however, ideally local communities would be able to access the ISDS system
directly themselves. In theory, the ISDS system is set up explicitly to prevent
this possibility-only foreign investors are supposed to be able to access it. Yet,
Tokios Tokels shows that the concept of the foreign investor has been expanded
to the point that it has accommodated domestic claimants posing as foreign
investors. Therefore, local communities are not necessarily excluded from
gaining the protections of the ISDS regime.
Tokios Tokelds v. Ukraine is a particularly prominent example of the
expansiveness of the concept of the "foreign investor."5 In Tokios Tokelds,
Ukrainian nationals owned ninety-nine percent of the outstanding shares and
comprised two-thirds of the management of Tokios Tokelds, which was
constituted as a Lithuanian joint stock company.159 Even though Tokios Tokelds
was effectively owned and controlled by Ukrainians, the ISDS tribunal permitted
Tokios Tokel6s to bring a claim against Ukraine.16 0 This is because the panel
declined to analyze the nationality of Tokios Tokel6s based on "the origin of [its]
capital." 16 1 Rather, the panel found that "the only relevant consideration [was]
whether the Claimant [was] established under the laws of Lithuania."162 The
Tokios Tokelds decision showcases the plasticity of the notion of a "foreign"
investor. It shows how domestic nationals can use creative corporate structures
Investors in social bonds tied to health outcomes might be able to file claims in such a scenario.
158. Tokios Tokelds v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction (Apr. 29,
2004) [hereinafter Tokios Tokelds Decision]; see also DUGAN ET AL., supra note 75, at 322-25.
159. Tokios Tokelds Decision, supra note 158, 21; DUGAN ET AL., supra note 75, at 322.
160. Tokios Tokelds Decision, supra note 158, ¶ 108.
161. Id T 80.
162. Id T 38.
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to gain the protections of a BIT or IIA containing ISDS provisions.
The malleable way in which the nationality of an investor is interpreted in
most BITs and IIAs has also had the paradoxical effect of extending the coverage
of most investment agreements beyond the parties to the agreements themselves.
For example, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) notes that "as long as a country has one (broadly worded) IIA, an
investor from any country could potentially benefit from that IIA by structuring
its investment into the country concerned through an entity established in the
other contracting party."163 This can have a dramatic impact in terms of enlarging
the geographic coverage of an IIA. UNCTAD notes, for example, that fifty-six
percent of foreign affiliates covered by the proposed Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP) are in fact ultimately owned by a parent company
that is not a member of one of the ten Asian countries who may sign this free
trade agreement.164 This means that while in theory only foreign investors who
are nationals of RCEP-member countries should be able to invoke ISDS
protections, in fact the majority of the entities that could invoke ISDS protections
are not nationals of these countries.
This provides a route for local communities to gain the protection of the
ISDS regime. To do so, local communities must first identify a revenue stream
upon which to base their claim and a method for making that revenue stream
legally "foreign." While the suggestions below are intended only as skeletal
blueprints of how this might be achieved, it appears that it can be done.
With regards to the revenue stream, low-income communities' aggregated
income represents a significant source of income. Consider, for example, the
financial power of burial societies16 5 and agricultural cooperatives.16 6 Each of
these revenue streams could serve as the basis for potential ISDS. claims if they
can be legally classified as a revenue stream directed to a foreign entity. In the
current age of corporate inversions and Tokios Tokelds-like corporate structures,
such a task should be feasible. For example, agricultural cooperatives could
incorporate abroad so as to appear foreign, much as Tokios Tokelds did.
If the revenue streams underpinning burial societies and agricultural
cooperatives could be made legally foreign, domestic communities would likely
gain powerful protections from the ISDS regime to push back against policies
they oppose. For example, suppose the government decides to remove
smallholder farmers from their land, such that earning an income from farming
becomes virtually impossible.16 7 This would effectively end the revenue stream
163. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2016-INVESTOR
NATIONALITY: POLICY CHALLENGES 185 (2016) (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 186.
165. See, e.g., Steve Kretzmann, Why I Belong to a Burial Society, GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/oct/12/why-i-belong-to-a-
burial-society-south-africa (providing an analysis of a burial society in South Africa).
166. See, e.g., About National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, NAT'L COUNCIL FARMER
COOPERATIVES, http://ncfc.org/about-ncfc (last visited Apr. 20, 2018) (explaining the purpose of farmer
cooperatives in the U.S. context).
167. See, e.g., Ethiopia: Land, Water Grabs Devastate Communities, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb.
18, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/18/ethiopia-land-water-grabs-devastate-communities
(describing instances of Ethiopia removing "pastoralists" from their land).
2018] 383
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
of the cooperative. Such an action would arguably "constitute constructive
expropriation" under Biloune as it would "ha[ve] the effect of causing the
irreparable cessation" of the activities that generated the revenue stream in the
first place (i.e., farming).16 8 If the State originally had a policy in place to protect
smallholders' land tenure, it would likely be possible to argue that this policy
shift constituted a violation of Tecmed's principles of "consistency" and "non-
arbitrary" behavior. If the agricultural cooperative had incorporated abroad, then
it would have standing under Tokios Tokelds. As such, the "foreign" cooperative
may well have strong claims under fair and equitable treatment and indirect
expropriation principles.
To the extent that domestic communities' revenue streams could be
structured so as to afford them the legal protections of the ISDS regime, this
would be preferable to trying to advance pro-human rights aims through
bondholder claims. As such, it is worth investigating further the potential
implications of Tokios Tokelds for domestic communities so that they could
begin using the ISDS regime directly to fight for their priorities. That is not to
say, however, that domestic communities hould pursue justice solely through
ISDS mechanisms to the exclusion of domestic avenues. Just as any effort by
investors to advance human rights is most likely to be successful if coordinated
with domestic movements, so, too, domestic communities would do well to use
ISDS claims as one prong of a larger strategy for advancing human rights
through the streets, through the courts, and through the legislature.
III. REASONS TO USE ISDS To ADVANCE HUMAN RIGHTS
While the previous Parts have explained how it may be possible for
bondholders and domestic claimants to use the ISDS regime to advance human
rights, this Part argues that doing so would be advantageous for two separate
reasons. First, the strategies proposed in this Note can work in the short term to
advance human rights, whereas other efforts to reform or eliminate the ISDS
regime are longer-term efforts. Second, ISDS claims can serve as a potent tool
for focusing the mind of the government and pushing it to adopt pro-human
rights policies, especially when coupled with pressure from domestic
constituencies. I consider each argument in turn.
A. A Short-Term Solution Amidst a Thicket ofLong-Term Proposals
To understand the advantages of this Note's proposed approach, it is
helpful to understand existing efforts to either reform or eliminate the ISDS
regime. On the reform side, a number of academics have put forward suggestions
168. Biloune Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, supra note 125, at 209.
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for improving both the procedural6 9 and substantive170 elements of the regime.
These reform efforts won a significant victory when both the United States and
Canada adopted some of the proposed changes to ISDS provisions in their own
model BITs. 17 1
Other States have sought to effectively eliminate the ISDS regime
altogether by withdrawing from it. In the Global North, much of the skepticism
regarding ISDS emanates from Europe. For example, the ISDS provisions in the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) threatened to sink the
entire negotiation process, with the European Commission suspending
negotiations for ninety days in early 2014 to allow for public consultations.17 2
Yet the most strident antagonism towards ISDS has come from the Global South.
Countries like Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela have submitted written notices
of denunciation of the ICSID Convention, a key convention underpinning the
ISDS regime.173 Brazil has refused to sign any treaties with ISDS mechanisms
in them.17 4 South Africas7 5 and Indonesia1 7 6 have both begun withdrawing from
key BITs, in part due to the ISDS provisions contained within them.
While efforts to eliminate the ISDS regime may succeed in the long term,
169. WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2015, supra note 34, at 28 ("Reform options include
improving the existing system of investment arbitration (refining the arbitral process, circumscribing
access to ISDS), adding new elements to the existing system (e.g. an appeals facility, dispute prevention
mechanism) or replacing it (e.g. with a permanent international court, State-State dispute settlement,
and/or domestic judicial proceedings)."); see also David Gartner, Private Investment and Public Health,
43 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 141, 153 (2014) ("Critics of the current international investment regime have
suggested a number of possible reforms to the system of investor-state dispute settlement. These proposed
reforms range from greater transparency, to a permanent appellate body ... ); Maria Sarmiento, General
Proposals To Improve the Current Dominating System of Investor-State Disputes Settlement (Nov. 30,
2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2702564.
170. See, e.g., Trans-Pacific Partnership art. 9.6(4), opened for signature Feb. 4,
2016, http://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text (not
yet in force) (trying to cabin the "fair and equitable treatment" doctrine by stating that "the mere fact that
a Party takes or fails to take an action that may be inconsistent with an investor's expectations does not
constitute a breach of [fair and equitable treatment]"); id. art. 29.5 (stating that the ISDS regime cannot
be used to challenge tobacco control measures).
171. Mavluda Sattorova, Reassertion of Control and Contracting Parties' Domestic Law
Responses to Investment Treaty Arbitration: Between Reform, Reticence and Resistance, in REASSERTION
OF CONTROL OVER THE INVESTMENT TREATY REGIME 53, 54-55 (Andreas Kulick ed., 2016) (noting that
these review efforts led the United States and Canada to include "references to the promotion of
sustainable development as one ofthe overarching treaty objectives alongside investment protection, more
detailed and elaborate provisions on expropriation and the guarantee of fair and equitable treatment and
public policy exceptions" in their treaty policies going forward).
172. Shawn Donnan & Stefan Wagstyl, Transatlantic Trade Talks Hit German Snag, FIN. TIMES
(Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cc5c4860-ab9d-1 1e3-90af-00144feab7de.html.
173. Sattorova, supra note 171, at 54 (regarding Ecuador and Bolivia); Sergey Ripinsky,
Venezuela's Withdrawalfrom ICSID: What It Does and Does Not Achieve, INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEV. (Apr. 13, 2012) https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/venezuelas-withdrawal-from-icsid-what-it-
does-and-does-not-achieve (regarding Venezuela).
174. The Arbitration Game, ECONOMIST (Oct. 11, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/
finance-and-economics/21623756-governments-are-souring-treaties-protect-foreign-investors-
arbitration.
175. Jonathan Lang, Bilateral Investment Treaties-A Shield or a Sword?, BOWMAN GILFILLAN
(Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.bowman.co.za/FileBrowser/ArticleDocuments/South-African-Govemment-
Canceling-Bilateral-Investment-Treaties.pdf.
176. Rick Beckmann, Remco Smorenburg, Jessica de Rooij & Kayla Feld, BIT by BIT in
Indonesia: Signs of a Push-Back on Foreign Investment, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (Oct. 2014),
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/20141002-bit-by-bit-in-indonesia-121533.pdf.
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they are unlikely to yield meaningful results in the near to medium term. This is
not only because the United States, which maintains a dominant position within
the global trade infrastructure, remains a supporter of ISDS.177 More
significantly, many BITs include "sunset" provisions so they can survive even
after one side terminates. For example, the 2012 U.S. Model BIT ensures that
ISDS mechanisms remain in place for a decade, even if one party unilaterally
withdraws.178 Germany's 2008 Model BIT contains a similar clause that keeps
the ISDS provision in place for two decades after termination.179 As a practical
matter, therefore, ISDS provisions in some form or another are almost certain to
remain for at least another generation.
It is therefore worth asking whether existing ISDS provisions can be used
to influence governments to adopt, or at least not roll back, pro-human rights
policies. Preferring instead to focus on macro-level questions, scholars and
activists have left this question largely unaddressed. Investors and domestic
communities can answer this question by pursuing the three legal strategies
detailed above.
If ISDS claims could be used to pressure States to maintain pro-human
rights policies, they would act as an effective counterweight to investors'
attempts to challenge State policies. Governments have begun accounting for
ISDS-related risk in their decision-making processes.180 Because existing ISDS
claims are almost always brought in order to preserve private business interests,
governments typically consider ISDS as a factor against pursuing a pro-human
rights policy that will negatively impact corporate concerns. If social impact
investors and domestic communities begin to bring human rights-related ISDS
claims, governments will have to recalibrate how they understand the risks posed
by the ISDS regime. Over time, governments may come to understand that
pursuing a course of action that backtracks on their human rights obligations
could provoke an ISDS claim. Thus, the cumulative effect may be to alter the
policymaking environment so as to disincentivize governments from failing to
fulfill their human rights obligations. If investors' claims are putting countries
into a regulatory freeze, claims that push States to pursue pro-human rights
policies could bring some much-needed defrosting.
B. The Advantages of Using Private Arbitration to Advance Human
Rights
Channeling human rights disputes into a private arbitration system is not
without its pitfalls. Even when proceedings are made public, ISDS mechanisms
can remain opaque to the public, meaning that many people will not understand
the proceedings that are adjudicating their human rights. While conceding that
this is troubling, this Note argues for a practical response to existing realities.181
177. See, e.g., U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 12, art. 24; Grewal, supra note 13 (noting America's
apparent unwillingness to abandon the ISDS system).
178. See U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 12, art. 22(3).
179. GERMAN MODEL TREATY-2008, supra note 12, art. 13:
180. See Van Harten & Scott, supra note 59.
181. One reason it is important that investors coordinate with domestic constituencies is to help
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Whether desirable or not, companies are already bringing human rights claims
into the ISDS arena. This Section identifies three important reasons why
investors should respond by affirmatively seeking to vindicate human rights
claims in ISDS proceedings.
One reason that investors might want to pursue the strategies proposed in
this Note is that ISDS mechanisms can provide a unique, private right of action
to proceed directly against governments attacking human rights. This sort of
private right is rare in international law, in which, traditionally, "nation-states
bring public claims against one another based on treaty or customary
international law before international tribunals of limited competence."l8 2 While
domestic courts do sometimes allow private individuals to proceed directly
against governments on human rights claims, the space for this sort of action
may be closing. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has narrowed the
possibility for litigants to bring Alien Tort Statute (ATS) claims against foreign
officials for violations of human rights.83
Meanwhile, although BITs, IIAs, and free trade agreements can include
provisions or side agreements related to issues of human rights, they often do not
provide an effective private right of action on human rights-related claims. The
NAFTA, for example, includes "side agreements" on labor and environmental
provisions.'84 These side agreements allow private actors to file petitions that
trigger investigatory procedures. However, as opposed to investors, private
actors are not easily able to compel arbitration over these environmental and
labor provisions.'8 5 Even when groups do petition governments, these efforts are
often in vain or delayed.'86 Given that international law mechanisms rarely
provide a private right of action on human rights-related issues-and those that
do are often slow and ineffective-the promise of a private right of action
through ISDS mechanisms is significant.
A second reason investors might want to work within the ISDS regime to
ensure that hose who are affected by the legal proceedings will have at least a basic understanding of the
claims themselves.
182. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2348
(1991).
183. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117 (2013) ("The principles
underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality hus constrain courts exercising their power under
the ATS.").
184. See North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499
(1993); North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480
(1993); see also Patricia Isela Hansen, Dispute Settlement in the NAFTA and Beyond, 40 TEX. INT'L L.J.
417,421-22 (2005) (discussing the functionality of these side agreements).
185. See Jack I. Garvey, Trade Law and Quality ofLife-Dispute Resolution under the NAFTA
Side Accords on Labor and the Environment, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 439, 445 (1995) ("The Side Agreements
specifically reject the creation of private rights of action against any party beyond rights under that party's
own national law."); see also Hansen, supra note 184 (noting that private citizens can "petition for
investigation of specific environmental and labor issues and for the publication of factual reports regarding
the results of these investigations" but hat "these dispute settlement mechanisms are far less powerful
than investor-state arbitration.").
186. See Alex Lawson, U.S. Loses First Labor Trade Case as Guatemala Prevails, LAW360
(June 26, 2017), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/938456/us-loses-first-labor-trade-case-as-guatemala-
prevails ("After nine years, the U.S. has come up short in its.bid to punish Guatemala for labor violations
under the Central American Free Trade Agreement-the first labor case brought under a trade deal.").
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advance human rights is that governments routinely comply with ISDS arbitral
awards and, when they do not, private actors have succeeded in aggressively
enforcing even large awards. This means that if social impact investors and
domestic communities prevail on their claims, they may be able to recoup
damages for affected communities. For example, if malaria bondholders prevail
in a case against a government seeking to end malaria treatment, the funds they
recoup could go towards buying medicines or other necessary treatment for
affected populations.
Most importantly, as the examples of Ethyl, Vattenfall, and Piero Foresti
show, often the real impact of ISDS claims is not measured in terms of their legal
success, but whether they bring the government to the negotiating table. Once at
the negotiating table, these companies are able to use the leverage of the ISDS
claims in order to extract important policy concessions from the government.
Similarly, social impact investors and domestic communities could use ISDS
claims to force the government to negotiate over particular policy changes
negatively affecting human rights. Such a strategy is most likely to prove
effective when coupled with a popular domestic campaign. For instance, an ISDS
claim regarding a government's decision to degrade malaria treatment could be
coupled with domestic protests from affected communities. The collective
influence of domestic political pressure and international egal pressure may help
convince the government to change course.187
One important limitation on this strategy is that the threat of an ISDS claim
must be credible in order for the government to take it seriously. It is likely that
Germany only agreed to settle with Vattenfall, for example, because it believed
that Vattenfall might actually succeed if the case were to proceed. Similarly,
human rights-related ISDS claims will grow more potent once they prove a track
record of success. As such, the first investors to try to use the ISDS mechanism
to advance human rights would do well to advance claims that are well-grounded
in existing jurisprudence. Returning to the example of the malaria bond, an ideal
first case might be one against a government that initially issues a malaria bond
and then later decides to ban essential anti-malaria medication, or ceases
supporting anti-malaria activities altogether. Such a scenario would fall squarely
within existing jurisprudence regarding indirect expropriation or fair and
187. In rare instances, it may be possible for social impact investors or domestic communities to
bring claims to directly counteract he claims of individual companies. As part of the settlement following
Vattenfall, for example, Hamburg ended up taking action that the European Commission believed was
contrary to existing EU environmental obligations. See Press Release, European Comm'n, supra note 47.
In that case, domestic communities dependent on the Elbe River-or social impact investors with a
financial stake in the fish of the Elbe-may have been able to bring a claim against the German
government because Hamburg had harmed their own financial interests. The tensions created by the
potential for competing claims might have had two positive effects. First, the German government may
have felt compelled not to settle with Vattenfall, or to settle with Vattenfall on less conciliatory terms, in
order to lessen the risk of claims from domestic communities or social impact investors. Second, if the
German government had allowed Vattenfall's claims to proceed to the arbitral panel, a parallel suit from
investors or a domestic community would have highlighted for the arbitral panel the other potentially
conflicting human rights obligations of the German government. Cf Eugenia Levine, Amicus Curiae in
International Investment Arbitration: The Implications of an Increase in Third-Party Participation, 29
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 200 (2011) (discussing human rights-related amicus curiae in ISDS). This may have
helped make the panel more amenable to the government's position.
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equitable treatment principles. If these early cases succeed, then cases that fall
more on the edges of existing jurisprudence, such as a case concerning a situation
where the government reduces its investment in the medical supply chain, may
be credible enough to force the government to consider altering its policies.
CONCLUSION
Since the late 1950s, the ISDS regime has expanded both geographically
and substantively. Key procedural elements of the ISDS regime enabled its
substantive expansion, particularly with regards to fair and equitable treatment,
indirect expropriation, and the concept of foreignness. As a result, companies
have grown increasingly adept at using ISDS mechanisms to challenge social
policies that they feel negatively affect heir investments. Threatened with costly
lawsuits and potential losses, States have often backtracked on pro-human rights
policies. This trend has led to attempts to reform or eliminate the ISDS regime,
but the regime appears deeply embedded within the international legal order.
Recognizing this reality, this Note has identified the types of claimants,
and claims, that might advance a human rights agenda through ISDS
mechanisms. If investors and domestic communities act with foresight, they can
gain the right to make these claims through either a social impact bond or by
structuring their assets to be covered by the relevant treaty. Following these
strategies will allow them to pursue ISDS claims to challenge State attempts to
degrade or eliminate important social policies.
Though these strategies require a significant investment of resources, they
are likely to be well worth the effort given the potential for ISDS claims to lead
to broader policy victories. As Ethyl's success against the Canadian government
shows, ISDS claims by themselves can convince governments to quickly reverse
course on a national policy. ISDS claims may be even more likely to convince
governments to change course when coordinated with domestic social
movements that can pressure the government to adopt pro-human rights policies.
Beyond purely utilitarian considerations, investors would be wise to coordinate
any ISDS claims with domestic movements. Failure to do so risks the possibility
that foreign investors will impose their own vision of human rights on the
domestic communities most directly affected.
Those working on longer-term efforts to reform or eliminate the ISDS
regime may also have reason to support the proposals made in this Note. If
domestic communities and investors begin filing claims, governments and even
some commercial interests may rethink their support of the current ISDS regime.
First, businesses may grow to resent the power that the ISDS regime affords
social impact investors and domestic communities to push governments to
maintain programs that, in some instances, may run counter to these businesses'
interests. Second, governments may become even more aware of the degree to
which the ISDS system's doctrinal provisions have expanded to allow multiple
challenges to their policies. This may convince governments to push for
procedural or treaty-based reforms of existing ISDS mechanisms. Alternatively,
it may push governments to abandon the system altogether. Either way, investors
and domestic communities who pursue the strategies outlined in this Note may
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